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Will We Build A Wall? 
Fear of Mexican/Latino Immigration
in U.S. History
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A presidential election was won on the strength of a nativist philosophy 
which asserts that the U.S. must build a wall of separation with its clos-
est neighbor to the South.  The current president has voiced not only his 
frustration and prejudices but the nativist sentiments of the public. The 
emphasis	on	“building	the	wall”	and	the	antagonism	expressed	towards	
Mexico	have	deepened	the	centuries-old	sense	of	fear	and	separation	felt	
by	members	of	 the	Mexican/Latino	 immigrant	group.	Can	we	 look	at	
history	 in	 search	of	plausible	 explanations?	This	paper	 examines	past	
and	contemporary	reasons	that	might	explain	the	observable	antagonism	
to	the	Mexican/Latino	population	in	the	U.S.	today.				
Key	words:	immigration,	U.S.	Mexicans,	nativism,	ethnocentrism,	his-
torical discrimination, civil rights
 A presidential election has just been won on the strength of 
a nativist philosophy that asserts that the U.S. must build a wall 
of separation with its closest neighbor to the South. President 
Trump’s anti-Mexican statements during the campaign and af-
ter the inauguration have been amply chronicled by the tele-
vision and the press in 2017. The dangers of President Trump’s 
rhetoric and performance are clearer after one year of his pres-
idency than they were before. As he himself states, he has not 
“evolved” in understandings (Sullivan, Haberman, & Davis, 
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2018). When his Chief of Staff attempted to soften some of his 
prior statements, the president responded to his political base: 
“the wall is the wall, it has never changed or evolved from the 
first time I conceived of it … The wall will be paid for directly 
or indirectly … by Mexico…” (Sullivan et al., 2018, para. 4). He 
was relentless in his contradiction of his Chief of Staff, who had 
said that “a 50 foot wall from sea to shining sea isn’t what we’re 
going to build” (Sullivan et al., 2018, para. 14). The President was 
giving voice to his frustration and prejudices as he captured 
what many citizens still wanted to hear. Given these feelings 
among the public—that many liberals may have thought had 
been overcome—the time is ripe for looking at history in search 
of plausible explanations for such an ingrained anti-Mexican 
sentiment. This paper will examine past and contemporary rea-
sons that might explain the observable antipathy to the Mexi-
can/Latino population in the U.S. today.  
The Historical Roots of Anti-Mexican Attitudes
  Many people associate anxiety about Mexican/Latino im-
migration in the U.S. exclusively with very recent Mexican and 
Latin American migrations. This is not the case. In the 15th Cen-
tury, at the same time that the Spanish were settling in Mexico 
and other parts of North America, the British, the Dutch and 
the French were also trying to compete for lands in the con-
tinent. The Black Legend about the Spanish “race” as a “brutal, 
sanguinary and sadistic” group of abusers was being propagat-
ed and taking root (Fuentes, 1992, p. 132). Even decades later, in 
the colonial territories, those who were moving inland, heirs 
to the Puritan thinking about the Spanish influence, sensed ac-
cording to De León (1987) “an ‘errand into the wilderness’ and 
felt a compelling need to control all that was beastly—sexuality, 
vice, nature, and colored peoples [sic]” (p. 1).
Order and discipline had to be rescued from the wilds in the 
name of civilization and Christianity. Moving westward with 
this mission uppermost in their minds, whites psychological-
ly needed to subdue the external world—forests, beasts, and 
other peoples—for the rational had to be ever in command. 
(De León, 1987, p. 1) 
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Today, the anxiety and fear of Mexicans persists after centuries 
and many waves of migrants. 
The Spanish Legacy: A Long-focus-lens View
 Spanish explorers were “the first Europeans to traverse 
much of the United States” (Daniels, 1990, p. 96) before the fre-
quently described arrival of the Pilgrims to Plymouth Rock in 
1569. After his ship wrecked in 1536, Cabeza de Vaca walked 
across what is now the western country from Galveston, Texas 
to Culiacan in Mexico. From the city of Santa Barbara in Mexico, 
the Spanish explorers and missionaries were lured north into 
what are today New Mexico and Arizona. New Mexico was set-
tled in 1598 (in fact, before the founding of Jamestown in Massa-
chusetts in 1610). From Santa Barbara in Mexico, “Spain hurried 
to lay claim to Texas” for at least two reasons: to resist threats 
from the French and to Christianize the Caddo Indians in the 
“kingdom of Teja,” ca, 1680s (Iber & De León, 2006, p. 57. See 
also Stewart & De León, 1993).
 The founding of St. Augustine by Pedro Menéndez de 
Avilés in 1565 provided an entry for Spain to respond militar-
ily to French Huguenot settlement in South Carolina (Daniels, 
1990). Florida was in Spanish hands for over two centuries from 
1565 to 1819.  At the same time the Spanish were settling in Mex-
ico and other parts of North America, the British, the Dutch and 
the French were also trying to compete for lands in the conti-
nent. The Spaniards had established themselves in Cuba, where 
“encomiendas” had been developing. Bartolomé de las Casas, 
who had been an “encomendero,” began speaking out against 
the treatment that representatives of the Spanish Crown were 
giving Indians. De las Casas became a Dominican Friar and 
moved to Mexico, where he continued to speak out indicting 
the Spaniards for their behavior. His indictments quickly be-
came the bases for a broadly encompassing Black Legend about 
the Spanish “race.” 
 In 1769, Junípero Serra founded twenty-one missions in Cal-
ifornia and the accompanying regiment to his expedition estab-
lished a fort in San Diego (Daniels, 1990). And these locations 
were only the most significant ones. Except for Florida, New 
Mexico, Arizona, California, parts of Nevada, Utah, Colora-
do, Oklahoma and Kansas remained part of Mexico until 1848 
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when the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo annexed them after the 
U.S. War with Mexico. Florida was acquired after many years 
of disputes and negotiations in 1819. In the west and southwest 
of the U.S., the Spanish/Mexican population was not, for a very 
long time, an immigrant population but rather an autochtho-
nous one. 
 An atmosphere permeated very early that transferred the 
sentiments towards the Spaniards to the Spanish/Mexicans 
once the first had left. The cruelty ascribed to the Spanish col-
onists also existed among other colonists but the fears that the 
Black Legend had spread among Anglos fueled attitudes specif-
ically about Mexicans, which were different from the attitudes 
about other foreign nationals arriving in the U.S. Rosales (1997) 
describes this entrenched Anglo attitude:  
Anglo-Americans held negative views even before confront-
ing Mexicans on New Spain frontiers where the encounter 
itself deepened prejudices and provided at least one import-
ant rationale for ‘Manifest Destiny.’ The violence of the Texas 
Rebellion and the Mexican War further fueled the antipathy. 
(Rosales, 1997, p. 5)
Additionally, with the arrival of African slaves to the new 
world, racism took complete hold of the minds and hearts of the 
White population. Racist attitudes in the U.S. persisted from the 
antebellum South until the Civil Rights movement and beyond. 
Even today, we can easily identify them in many policies, if not 
federal, passed by state legislatures. Racist attitudes and policies 
colored immigration in the U.S. from the start as illustrated by 
the “yellow peril” legend forbidding Chinese immigrants and 
by the internment of Japanese American citizens during WWII. 
 Texas played an important role in shaping the attitudes 
of Anglos toward Mexicans. In 1821 the Mexican government 
granted the Missourian entrepreneur Moses Austin coloniza-
tion rights in Texas. He and his son Stephen and hundreds of 
followers moved into Texan territory. Austin’s ambitions includ-
ed “his sole and only desire … to redeem it from the wilder-
ness—to settle it with an intelligent, honorable and enterpris-
ing people” (Stephen Austin, quoted by de León, 1987, p. 3). 
De León further comments that it was clear that Austin’s and 
other politicians’ desire was to Americanize Texas, “settled by 
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a population that will harmonize with their neighbors on the 
East, in language, political principles, common origin, sympa-
thy, and even interest” (de León, 1987, p. 3).  In other words, the 
Americanization of Texas did not have room for native Mexi-
cans who were deemed neither civilized nor capable of being 
anything other than field hands. However, current scholarship 
shows that Mexicans were never peripheral to their history, par-
ticularly in Texas, where they participated actively in state and 
local government and “undertook a conscious effort to modern-
ize the society of Texas” after the Texas war for independence in 
1836 (Stewart & de León, 1993, p. 99).
 In looking for historical explanations of the disdain with 
which Mexican immigrants are regarded, one cannot ignore 
the early religious clashes between Roman Catholicism (Spain 
and its colonies being the main inheritors) and Henry VIII. The 
English saw the Spanish as heartless, and Spanish and Span-
ish Americans as the embodiment of racial impurity, exempli-
fied by mestizaje with the Moors and the Indians. In Protestant 
Christianity they saw native Catholicism as pagan and demon-
ic. Although the anti-Catholic feelings in colonial America were 
to some extent rhetorical because few members of the public 
had ever seen a Catholic, they persisted with unusual strength. 
By the end of the colonial period in the Eastern border, there 
were “only about 25,000 practicing Catholics … and almost all 
of those in Pennsylvania and Maryland” (Daniels, 1990, p. 109).
 Another major factor that persisted far beyond the colonial 
period, and can even be detected today, is hostility to the lan-
guage. The maintenance of the English language became a much 
stronger issue in the new nation. After the annexation of the 
various Spanish territories in the Southwest, Spanish remained 
predominant in many areas. For example, Rosales (1997) states 
that Texan local politicians delivered speeches in both English 
and Spanish well into the early 20th century, and of course the 
New Mexican legislature conducted business in Spanish un-
til they became a state. Part of the statehood discussions as to 
whether New Mexico and Arizona could be joined pivoted on 
language and what the Arizonians called “racial differences.” 
Arizonian’s fears were summarized in a protest presented to 
Congress in 1906, which suggested that any amalgamation 
with New Mexico had little chance of success. Finally, by 1912, 
after a long and protracted debate over language in Congress, 
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President Taft signed the New Mexico Statehood Proclamation. 
This proclamation settled, at least temporarily, the language is-
sue, as it recognized the state’s constitution, which stated: “For 
the first twenty years after this constitution goes into effect all 
laws passed by the legislature shall be published in both the En-
glish and Spanish languages” (State of New Mexico, 1911/2017, 
Art. XX–12). 
Nativism and Flooding Immigration
 The financial panic of 1873 began an anti-immigrant period 
that was to last almost until WWII. Labor strikes, unemploy-
ment and overall financial distress were serious problems. In 
1894, a group of Harvard graduates formed the Immigration 
Restriction League, a pressure group that argued for funda-
mental changes in the immigration policies. 
According to one of its founders, Prescott F. Hall, the ques-
tion for Americans to decide was whether they wanted their 
country ‘to be peopled by British, German and Scandinavian 
stock, historically free, energetic, progressive, or by Slav, Lat-
in and Asiatic races historically downtrodden, atavistic and 
stagnant.’ (Daniels, 1990, p. 276)
Within the spirit of restricting immigration, a large number of 
bills made their way through Congress (1895, 1897,1913,1915), 
sometimes getting to the presidents, who typically vetoed them, 
until 1917. These bills had a common theme, which was literacy. 
Presidents Grover Cleveland, Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson 
stated, as many do today, that the U.S needed labor and that the 
immigrants were here to do work Americans did not want to do. 
(Yet, as we well know today, factual labor needs do not overcome 
the assumptions of loss of even undesired employment opportu-
nities experienced by many in the native populations.) A bill was 
finally passed in 1917, but by then, European immigration had 
decreased due to the war in Europe. The 1917 law was in essence 
a literacy bill that was eventually proven not to have had the de-
sired effect of restricting immigration. (Daniels, 1990; Lukens, 
2012; U.S. Immigration Legislation Online, n.d.).
 In 1910 the Mexican Revolution erupted, and in 1914 WWI 
was declared. American soldiers fighting in the War created a 
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labor shortage in the U.S. and Mexicans that had been coming to 
this country as a consequence of the Mexican Revolution were 
encouraged to work in the USA. The restrictive 1917 Immigration 
Law did not fundamentally affect residents of some countries of 
the Western Hemisphere, including Latin America because, in 
spite of the literacy restrictions in the bill, waivers were given 
for temporary agricultural and railroad workers. However, the 
restrictive measures emboldened the nativist spirit that contin-
ued to prevail. In 1921, the Emergency Immigration Restriction 
Act established an immigration system based on quotas related 
to the percentage of the population who had originated in given 
countries. However, it provided a loophole for many Europeans 
who moved to Western Hemisphere non-quota countries before 
coming to the U.S. This led to the laws of 1921 and finally to the 
Act of 1924 which related quotas and birthplace (McSeveney, 
1987). The way quotas were determined favored the Northern 
European countries that had been represented in the U.S. popu-
lation for a long time. In a recent New York Times article, Stapinski 
(2017) vividly discusses the consequences of the 1924 immigra-
tion Act that closed doors for the poorest and neediest Italians.
 As we have just seen, during the peak of the Nativist de-
bate, Mexican laborers had been granted temporary entry to 
work primarily, but not exclusively, in the fields. However, after 
1924, the Immigration and Naturalization Service tightened the 
enforcement of border crossings, and Mexicans were often de-
ported without due process. The 1929 Immigration Act was a 
victory of nativists and resulted in the deportation not only of 
Mexican nationals but of many native Mexican-Americans from 
industrial cities like Chicago where they had been working in 
the car industries. As the economic situation deteriorated, the 
popular imagery and the political talk often referred to “half-
breeds” and many other racial epithets and criticized their in-
ability to become citizens.
Between 1929 and 1936, at least six hundred thousand Mexican 
nationals and their children, many of whom were born in the 
U.S., returned to Mexico—this represented about one third of 
the U.S. Mexican population. Economic downturns had been 
a constant factor in their lives, but nothing compared to the 
suffering created by this crisis. (Rosales, 1997, p. 49)
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The Bracero Program
 Between 1942 and 1965, a very important development took 
place. Given the scarcity of labor created by WWII, the U.S. and 
Mexican governments signed a formal agreement for the re-
cruitment of workers. There were two types of workers recruit-
ed by the so called Bracero Agreement. Part of the agreement 
was for agricultural workers. As part of the agreement, 4.6 mil-
lion contracts were issued between 1943 and 1965. The second 
part of the agreement related to railroad maintenance workers, 
and 69,000 authorizations were issued between 1943 and 1945 
(Alarcón, 2011). The important thing to remember in relation 
to this government-to-government agreement is that both the 
U.S and Mexico promised to apply the protections of the law 
(labor laws, public health, fair treatment, etc.) to the “bracero” 
workers. The governments also agreed to withdraw a certain 
amount of savings (about 10%) from the workers’ salaries. These 
monies would be returned to the workers at the end of the con-
tract, generally by the Mexican government. However, no sav-
ings were initially returned and the controversy over the issue 
continued until a settlement was reached in a California court 
in 2008 (Belluck, 2008). The final blow to the Bracero Agreement 
was dealt by the U.S and the Mexican governments when, in 
1947, they targeted for return undocumented immigrants from 
California and Texas. Finally, in 1954, through Operation Wet-
back, more than one million workers from the West Coast were 
deported. Many other laws and mass deportations followed in 
the 1950s, targeting undocumented workers, but the impact of 
the “braceros” became indelibly registered in the public psyche.
 Another important variable which was a determinant of the 
historical discrimination towards Mexicans, and to some ex-
tent of their self-perception, was the conflicting messages sent 
by the Bureau of the Census in its counting practices and the 
equally conflicting messages sent by some of the early Latino 
organizations in relation to race among Mexican Americans. 
The first time the Census identified Mexicans in its population 
counts was in 1930. Until 1920, the Census had not identified 
Mexicans; however, the enumerators tended to note the pres-
ence of Spanish surnamed “mulatos” in the Western States 
(Ortiz & Telles, 2012, p. 4). The 1930 Census provided specific 
instructions for the counting of Mexicans, identifying them as 
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a very mixed group belonging primarily, if not totally, to the 
laboring classes. According to Ortiz and Telles (2012), the use of 
‘laborers’ in the first line of the Census instructions “suggests 
that class may have played a role into the use of Mexican in 
that laborers might have been classified as Mexican but higher 
status Mexicans might have been classified as White” (Ortiz & 
Telles, 2012, p. 4). This caused the Mexican government and the 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) to protest 
about using Mexican as a racial category, and from there on, un-
til the 1980 Census which allowed for self-identification, Mex-
icans who may have marked “other” in the Census form were 
classified as White. In looking at the LULAC advocacy effort, 
one may say that it was based more on pragmatic rather than 
unprejudiced considerations.
 An interesting significant event, which involved a number 
of well-known civil rights attorneys and LULAC in the post 
WWII period, addressed race/class classification in a criminal 
case which made it to the Supreme Court. The case, Hernandez	
v.	the	State	of	Texas, was about a migrant cotton picker accused 
of murder in a small town in Jackson County, Texas. The lead 
defense attorney, Gustavo Garcia, 
envisioned the Hernandez case as a challenge to the system-
atic exclusion of persons of Mexican origin from all types of 
jury duty in at least seventy counties in Texas. It was not sur-
prising to him when Hernandez was found guilty and the 
decision was upheld by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. 
(Allsup, 2010, para. 1)
When the Supreme Court finally heard the case in January, 1954, 
under Chief Justice Warren, the defense attorney, Garcia, argued 
that the 14th Amendment guaranteed protection not only on 
the basis of race but of class. The State of Texas contended that 
the 14th Amendment covered only race, Whites and Blacks, not 
class, and that Mexican Americans were White—at least at that 
moment. However, the Supreme Court, ordering the reversal of 
conviction, “accepted [recognized] the concept of distinction by 
class, that is, between white and Hispanic, and found that when 
laws produced unreasonable and different treatment on such 
basis [class differences], the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection is violated” (Allsup, 2010, para. 2). This was a great 
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triumph for the concept of “other white” applied to Mexicans, a 
concept that persisted until the 1970s. 
 These changing classifications fueled Mexicans’ own prob-
lematic definition of self and influenced the public images of the 
group. Given the complex intersection of race, ethnicity, class, 
gender, and other dimensions in the modern world, it is not sur-
prising to find that members of many groups find themselves 
confused by the Census and sometimes the courts, which, by 
default, required until very recently single classifications. The 
question of any individual’s racial classification among Hispan-
ics is left to the individual. “What am I?” a person would ask. 
The answer could be Hispanic and White, for example, or His-
panic and Black, etc. 
Does History Explain the Continued Disdain
and Fear of the Mexican Immigrant?
 Although the history of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. has 
been characterized by complicated policies since there was a 
border, the history of other groups can be said to be similarly 
complex. However, disdain appears to have remained unabated 
for Mexicans even though, in many cases, they had been fluidly 
moving across the diffused southern border of the U.S. since 
1848. It must be recognized that Filipinos, Chinese and Japa-
nese Americans were also victims of discrimination and repa-
triation, but after WWII, and after the Civil Rights efforts, their 
situation was much improved. 
  After WWII, Mexicans and Latinos had continued their 
struggle, primarily in the area of land rights and the labor front, 
struggle that gave rise the most significant Chicano civil rights 
movement of contemporary times. The 1960s was a time of civ-
il rights struggle. The movement involved many leaders and 
many goals, ranging from the struggle for the rights of workers 
(led by César Chávez) to the return of land in New Mexico (led 
by Reies Lopez Tijerina). Reies Tijerina took a bold approach 
with the Alianza	Federal	de	 las	Mercedes that proposed separat-
ism and militancy on the bases of lost land and language. César 
Chavez, the icon of today, a Ghandi-like leader, focused on the 
defense of the work place. Strikes and unionization, which had 
not been the tools of migrant workers before, became the call 
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of Chávez’ resistance. For César Chávez, the Braceros, who 
continued to enter the U.S. providing cheap labor for the agri-
cultural fields, represented an unrelenting impediment to the 
improvement of the living and working conditions of the Chi-
canos already living here. Iber and De León (2006) state that “for 
millions of ordinary Americans, mostly oblivious to the terrible 
plight of migrant workers, the activities and efforts of the late 
César Chávez (and, ultimately, those of the United Farm Work-
ers, the UFW) served as an introduction to the Chicano/a move-
ment” (pp. 266–267). Chicanos had entered the public discourse. 
As long as there were unorganized Mexicans who followed the 
crops in the West, there was plenty of room for disdain, disem-
powerment and rejection. The harsh living conditions in which 
these workers lived and labored insured the perpetuation of 
poverty, poor education, isolation, bad health conditions, etc., 
all of which created a caste-like group, a target of unjustifiable 
rejection. Today, in spite of progress and changing public atti-
tudes, many examples of continued rejection are endorsed from 
the highest levels of government.
 Alarcón (2011) suggests a circular migration pattern for 
undocumented workers across a porous border. The flow of 
temporary workers continued even after Operation Wetback 
in 1954. It was clear that the border was porous and that any 
control of immigration would require legislation. Up to 1968, 
Mexicans were able to enter the U.S. without numerical restric-
tion (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002). However, in 1968, the 
Western Hemisphere cap of 120,000 was applied, and Mexicans 
had to compete for a limited number of visas. But Massey et al. 
(2002) also suggest that the hemispheric limitations coincided 
with the end of the Bracero program that had provided tem-
porary opportunities to many agricultural workers. Thus, the 
limitations imposed on Mexicans were felt very keenly, and ille-
gality became a real (and perhaps the only) option for a country 
with a long history of labor exchanges with the U.S. 
 Many other important pieces of legislation followed the 
1968 measures and restricted the number of legal entries from 
Mexico and Latin America (e.g., the 1976 country-based quotas; 
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, IRCA, and many 
others). No one expected the dire repercussions of these pol-
icies. Scholars comment on the paradoxical nature of the U.S. 
immigration policies which were not intended “to create a large 
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undocumented Latino population living north of the border,” 
but which unleashed a chain of events with compounding dire 
effects through a succession of positive and negative measures 
(Massey & Pren, 2012, p. 6). The exponential growth of the Lati-
no population between 1970 and 2010 was often ascribed only 
to the undocumented, and that situation caused tremendous 
damage to the legality of Mexican/Latino immigrants. 
 César Chávez’s explanation still provides a valid rationale 
for the negativism experienced by the immigrant Mexican to-
day: as long as there is heavy movement of people across the 
border who can be easily exploited for their labor, it will con-
tinue to be possible to devalue natives, old-time residents, and 
recent arrivals. 
The Latino Threat Narrative
 The large and continued number of Mexicans and other 
Latin Americans entering the U.S, often undocumented, had 
become a preoccupation of the public even before 2001. The Sep-
tember 11, 2001 attack, although not related to Latinos, brought 
about the reappearance of overt anti-immigrant sentiments 
that, while focusing on the Muslim population, quickly spread 
to all immigrants. Immigration problems became recurrent in 
the public narrative. In 2008, the economic crisis intensified an-
ti-immigrant public feelings. Mexicans and Hispanics were as-
sociated primarily with labor areas where unemployment was 
high (construction, hospitality industries, service professions, 
and others). This aggravated the hostility of low paid native 
workers. Yet, the immigrant population, particularly of illegals 
from Mexico and Latin America, continued to grow, and by 
2010, reached 50.5 million. Rather than attempting to find real 
solutions, a demonization of the Hispanic population general-
ly (not exclusively the Mexican) emerged in very public ways. 
These sentiments were exploited to garner political support and 
agency resources, as examples for border security and control. 
The result was a self-perpetuating cycle in which rising bor-
der apprehensions were manipulated to produce a conser-
vative reaction that demanded more enforcement measures, 
which in turn produced more apprehensions, which then 
produced more conservatism and even harsher enforcement 
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measures, which generated more apprehensions (Massey & 
Pren, 2012, p. 6). 
 But as we have discussed, it was not hard to blame His-
panics, whether Mexican or others. Their very presence fueled 
old notions of criminals, sex offenders, drug dealers and other 
people living outside the law. Specific cases of a criminal act 
were reported, and the public clamored for radical measures 
to be taken against this “despised” group which was living in 
the midst of white America. For example, in August 2016, Time 
Magazine reported Trump stating that “When Mexico sends its 
people, they’re not sending their best … . They’re sending peo-
ple that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those prob-
lems [to] us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. 
They’re rapists.” And, attempting to soften the statements, he 
added: “And some, I assume, are good people” (Reilly, 2016, 
pp. 3, 7). The narrative was intense and journalists spoke of a 
drowning of the culture, alien hordes, and the flooding of the 
U.S. (Andreas, 2000; Chávez, 2001). Massey and Pren (2012) have 
suggested that it is not easy to document the rise of xenophobia 
because it is not asked in surveys, but they trace it to the rise of 
border apprehensions and the rise of conservatism in the U.S., 
which are reliably measured. Reporting the results of a recent 
Gallup survey, McCarthy (2015) suggests that “the treatment of 
Hispanics, particularly of immigrants, takes on special signifi-
cance as the nation continues to debate immigration reform” (p. 
4). Very pointedly, he reports on the gravity of the issue which 
has been highlighted by Donald Trump, not only during his 
presidential election campaign, but also as his presidency be-
gan and executive measures were implemented. 
The Current Situation in the U.S.
 According to the Pew Hispanic Center (2011), the number of 
immigrants annually leaving Mexico for the U.S. declined by 
60% between 2006 and 2010. A decline was also reported by the 
Migration Policy Institute in 2016, which stated:
In the last decade and a half, the Mexican share among all 
immigrants dropped from 29.5% in 2000 to 27.6% in 2014 … 
Mexico is no longer the top origin country among the most 
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recent immigrants to the U.S. In 2013, China and India over-
took Mexico as the most common countries of origin of im-
migrants who have resided in the U.S. for one year or less. 
Furthermore, more Mexican immigrants have returned to 
Mexico than have migrated to the U.S. since the end of the 
2007–2009 Great Recession. (Zong & Batalova, 2016, pp. 1–2)
This decline, however, did not alter the anti-immigrant public 
discourse brought about by the political campaigns since 2012. 
 The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA 2007-
2012) was the immigration policy that allowed some minors 
who entered the country with their undocumented parents to 
receive a renewable two-year period of deferred action from 
deportation and to be eligible for work, study or service in 
the armed forces. The cause of these “dreamers,” as they were 
known, was highlighted during and after President Obama’s 
re-election campaign in 2012. These events activated the same 
nativism that had historically plagued the U.S. 
 In July 2016, a document from the Migration Policy Institute 
Transatlantic Council on Migration suggested that anti-immi-
grant sentiment all over the world is not necessarily changed by 
the reality of numbers. Nothing could have been truer for the 
status of the Mexican immigrant in the U.S.
Anti-immigrant sentiment does not reliably correspond to an 
increase in the volume of newcomers, either in absolute or 
relative terms. Sharp reaction—such as significant legislative 
changes, symbolic signs of exclusion (e.g., banning minarets), 
and (in extreme instances) anti-immigrant violence—have 
occurred in places without large or sudden increases in the 
immigrant population. Meanwhile, several countries and re-
gions that have recently received sizeable unexpected inflows 
have not experienced social disorder. (Papademetriou & Ban-
ulescu-Bogdan, 2016, p. 6)
 During the 2016 presidential campaign, the fear and anxiety 
about Mexican and Latin American immigrants reached peak 
expression in the language of Donald Trump, who aspired to 
tailor his message to large numbers of displaced workers whose 
situation had deteriorated in the past decade. A 2016 MPI re-
port suggested that “economic concerns that lead to the per-
ception of immigrants as competition for scarce resources and 
171Chapter TitleWill We Build A Wall?
opportunities … can be particularly acute in areas less accus-
tomed to migration and where segments of the native popu-
lation are experiencing economic hardship” (Papademetriou 
& Banulescu-Bogdan, 2016, p. 1). This clearly played out in the 
election in 2016, as Trump’s message appeared to make an im-
pact upon his intended target audience.
 The nativist discourse of the current President of the U.S. 
is frequently offensive to American citizens’ values, but crowd 
approval of many aggrieved workers fuels his slogans. The an-
ti-immigrant and pointedly anti-Latino views were evident in 
his comments on former candidate Jeb Bush, whom Trump said 
had to “like the Mexican illegals because of his wife” (Kaplan, 
2015, para. 2). Unfortunately, Trump’s constant harping on the 
border wall and his apparent conviction that Mexico would pay 
for it continued to ignite the nativist flames of his followers. But 
beyond personal insults, even before Trump’s election, Mexico 
was the target of inaccurate public speech intended to humili-
ate. Mexican immigrants were framed as usurpers of American 
jobs, even though the business community attempted to correct 
the record, suggesting that immigrants were doing jobs that 
Americans would not or could not do. 
 Another point to which we have referred in the historical 
narrative was that the American public at large had never fun-
damentally acknowledged the contributions of Latinos, par-
ticularly Mexicans immigrants and their descendants, to the 
culture and fiber of the U.S. (Fuentes, 1992; Griswold del Cas-
tillo & de León, 1996; Sheridan, 1986). As César Chávez feared, 
the Mexican immigrant, unlike the European, had been seen 
as a laborer (a bracero) and little else (Rosales, 1997). Even to-
day, Mexican immigrants are seldom the object of admiration 
in the way that other immigrants are recognized when “pull-
ing themselves up by their bootstraps.” Some efforts of Latino 
actors are recognized and gain a level of popular support and 
understanding (e.g., Edward J. Olmos’s Films, such as Stand and 
Deliver [Labunka, Law, & Muska, 1998]) but they are often pop-
ular because of the actor’s stardom. Even the “dreamers” who 
have become well-known because of their accomplishments 
now worry about their future. The issue of ending the protec-
tions of DACA reached unforeseen proportions with the “shut-
ting down of the government” in January 2018. 
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Various Forms of Remediation Were Attempted
 During the Civil Rights period, the issue of broadening the 
basis of the Chicano movement beyond the plight of the agri-
cultural workers had been pursued by Reies Tijerina with the 
Alianza	Federal de las Mercedes (1963–1970). The aliancistas had al-
ways been more openly combative in pursuits beyond the rights 
of workers. They wanted lands returned and had some success 
when El Chamizal, the disputed border area of the Rio Grande, 
was returned to Mexico in 1963 through a treaty signed by Pres-
idents Kennedy and Lopez Mateo. Chávez had looked towards 
the unions as support for the field workers and looked to peace-
ful means to solve the problems of workers. On the other hand, 
some members of the Alianza, Tijerina in particular, upholding a 
strong sense of entitlement, believed that confrontation might get 
them further afield. The aliancistas projected self-assurance and 
did not shy away from confrontation. But they quickly became 
associated with violence in the minds of the authorities and the 
public tended to reject the perceived strength of their movement. 
 LULAC (1929—today), the oldest of the Latino organiza-
tions, was committed to a more legalistic agenda and weighed 
in, as we have seen in the Hernandez case, in civil rights cases. 
LULAC attempted to develop a cooperative relationship among 
the various Latino, Black and white groups, to develop an agen-
da for all Latinos and to respond to challenges through a well-
thought out platform of political and legal action that has often 
been compared to the NAACP. In fact, the cooperation between 
LULAC and the NAACP and a number of California attorneys 
advanced greatly the cause of school desegregation which had 
begun with the well-known California case of Mendez	v.	West-
minster. In a recent book about this little known and successful 
case before the CA Supreme Court in 1947, Strum (2010) writes:
All parties agreed that Mexican ancestry, not race … was the 
crux of the matter. But counsel for the many parents who 
joined in the suit laid the groundwork for a far broader as-
sault on arbitrary classifications and discrimination against 
one people because they happened to share a heritage. The 
heritage was not only Mexican; it was also Spanish-speak-
ing. For school boards, assumptions about language skills, 
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cleanliness, ability to learn, and “Americanness” were code 
words for long-established anti-Latin-American prejudices. 
Mendez	exposed these to the light of social science and law 
and found them wanting. (Strum, 2010, p. IX)
What the variety of approaches and philosophies that have been 
involved in the long struggle for Mexican recognition shows is 
that in spite of the efforts and successes, the Mexican-immigrant 
and even the Mexican-American remained more marginalized 
and disparaged than other immigrant groups. 
 While many Latinos were relieved that the 2001 terrorist 
attack did not involve any immigrants from the Americas, the 
term “immigrant” began to escalate public suspicion. The sit-
uation of the Mexican immigrant became further aggravated 
with the economic downturn of 2008. Immigrants became the 
obvious target of hatred, and Mexicans being the closest, most 
numerous and poorest, fitted the public search for a scapegoat. 
 The building of a wall announced during the 2016 Presiden-
tial campaign became a rallying cry for those who had harbored 
not just populist philosophies but xenophobic and chauvinistic 
points of view. Steve Bannon, until recently one of Trump’s most 
influential advisors and driving force behind right wing Breitbart 
News, made no bones about banning all immigrants; his ties to 
the KKK were never hidden, receiving endorsement by its lead-
er, David Duke. In spite of hopes that Trump’s election would 
extinguish the racist fires, now President Trump’s rhetoric and 
anti-Hispanic actions could continue unobstructed. 
 From a post-election vantage point, it has become clear that 
candidate Trump’s campaign views about Judge Gonzalo Curiel 
of the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of California, 
or his views on DACA, or the Wall, or for all matters related 
to Hispanics, did not necessarily change after his election. His 
views about a whole cultural and linguistic tradition continued 
to be made explicit in almost daily behavior.
The racism at the core of Trump’s agenda was laid bare when 
he pardoned former Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who was 
awaiting a prison sentence for defying a court order that 
barred him from racially profiling Latinos. As a result of the 
August 25 pardon, Arpaio, who rose to national prominence 
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for his anti-immigrant tactics in Maricopa County, will never 
be held accountable for his years of unconstitutional conduct. 
(Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC], 2018, “Promoting a 
racist agenda,” para. 10)
Concluding Comments
 Researchers have looked into linguistic differences, reli-
gious beliefs, perceived threats to norms and values of the re-
ceiving society and many elements that can hinder openness 
to immigrants. The general consensus is that no single factor 
can be directly correlated to outbreaks of public dissatisfaction 
with new arrivals of any immigrant group (Papademetriou & 
Banulescu-Bogdan, 2016). And yet, each of those factors appears 
with frequency and is used often as explanation for why a par-
ticular group is not fitting into the nucleus of a specific soci-
ety. What the research literature shows is that a predilection for 
groups that blend easily into the host society has been a histor-
ical and sociological fact. 
 Nativist and xenophobic dialogues have ebbed and flowed 
in the public discourse in the U.S., with different groups being 
targets at different historical periods. These historical periods 
usually were the result of, or predicted, global crises. For exam-
ple, the strength of movements such as the KKK or the Know 
Nothing Party at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th 
Century was a result of primarily southerners losing their grip 
on slavery at the same time that they were overwhelmed by 
outsiders--Catholics and foreigners, all people deemed differ-
ent. The sequelae of slavery and the unabated fear of Blacks 
has always been a factor that, by extension, served to continue 
anti-Mexican sentiments and behaviors. Mexicans were darker 
and were viewed as a threat to the expectations of the commu-
nity. Spikes or “perceived spikes” of undocumented immigrants 
can “harden attitudes toward immigration … particularly when 
substantial shares … of flow originate from the same country or 
sub region” (Papademetriou & Banulescu-Bogdan, 2016, p. 9), in 
this case, Mexico and Latin America. 
 One can continue to search for explanations of how and 
why the negative perceptions about Mexican immigrants have 
survived with such persistence. We have shown how Mexicans 
in particular have been a targeted immigrant group in the U.S. 
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In spite of the fact that, as the popular saying goes, “they did 
not really cross the border but the border crossed them,” the 
massive size and economic power of the North was a magnet 
that caused large numbers of immigrants to arrive to fill labor 
needs throughout the decades. The constant flow was made up 
of both documented and undocumented persons. Mexico was, 
as Porfirio Diáz, controversial seven-term President of Mexico, 
is reputed to have said, “too far from God and too close to the 
United States.” Mexicans were a constant presence in the host 
country and never appeared to gain stability or to blend with 
the natives. 
 Mexicans/Latinos were not helped to identify as Americans 
with ease. It was not until second and third generations had 
served in the military and received schooling that made them 
feel less separate from peer groups that they claimed more 
readily their American identity. It would appear that Mexicans/
Latinos, if not fully despised, were certainly not highly regard-
ed, desirable or fully appreciated as a community. Recently, the 
current emphasis on “building the wall” and the antagonism 
expressed towards Mexico and its leadership have deepened 
the sense of fear and separation felt by the members of the Lati-
no immigrant group. Thus, it can be said, that the ghost of the 
Black Legend has risen again. Linguistic, religious and social 
differences that fueled animosity and contributed to the dis-
tancing of the early immigrant groups continue today, feeding 
mutual suspicion. The current political leadership and its xe-
nophobic inclinations fuel sentiments that may have been dor-
mant in the general public.
 It is sad to recognize that there are no complete explanations 
for the prejudicial sentiments which U.S. citizens have exhibited 
towards Mexican and Latino immigrants. Changes in attitudes 
will require a profound cultural transformation. However, on a 
more hopeful note, there has been a significant increase in the 
educational, political and business gains made by earlier Lati-
no immigrants and their children. Once the current xenopho-
bic wave passes, this may significantly weaken the historical 
animosity toward the group. The level of political leadership 
exercised by Hispanics today is significant, and combined with 
demographic changes, cannot be ignored.
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